23.
Innovation by interaction
Earlier, in item 15 in this blog I discussed
the importance of cognitive distance for learning and innovation, in
collaboration between people or organizations. Such distance should be large
enough to tell or show each other something new but not so large that there is
no mutual understanding and tolerance. We need distance for potential novelty
but proximity to realize it. Why and how, more precisely, does that work? Here
I apply my theory of invention, set out in item 18.
In item 15 I showed that at any cognitive
distance one is faced not only with the need to fit the ideas of the other into
one’s own cognition, but also the need to help others fit one’s own ideas and
practices into theirs. Thus people can help each other to cross cognitive
distance and trigger shifts of thought.
In terms of the cycle of invention discussed in
item 18, this positing of one’s ideas into the minds of others entails generalization,
the attempt to fit one’s ideas into novel areas. Depending on cognitive
distance, this yields misfits in understanding that require adjustment. People
will try to ‘put it differently’, thinking back to how they came to grips with
the idea, what other ideas they tried, and what other ideas are related to it,
in their experience. In terms of the cycle of invention, this entails differentiation.
As people do this reciprocally, they are stimulated to try and fit elements of
the other’s thought into their own thinking, in hybrids of thought and practice
(reciprocation), which stimulate a novel synthesis thinking and action (accommodation).
One can increase abilities to cross cognitive
distance by an accumulation of knowledge and experience in the practice of
crossing distance. However, as one
accumulates knowledge one needs to search at increasing cognitive distance to
still encounter something new, finding fewer and fewer sources of further
novelty, and increasingly one has only oneself to counsel. Geniuses and wise
people are lonely.
The
two-sidedness or reciprocity of the process of learning by interaction yields
immense leverage, compared to interaction with non-human nature, since in the
mutual adaptation of discourse the ‘receiver’ can shift his stance and outlook
to catch a meaning and the ‘sender’ can adapt to such stance in pitching his
meaning, and revising his metaphors and bringing in meanings from yet other
contexts.
In theory
of knowledge, the cycle of invention is my answer to the old problem of object
and subject, or of the outside and the inside. Are objects in the world causes
of the cognition of the perceiving subject, in the form of representations in
the mind, as empiricism claims, or are objects in the world perceived in terms
of prior cognitive categories of the subject (such as time, space and causality),
as idealism claims, or are object and subject inseparable. According to the
cycle all three are right. Objects are perceived and made sense of in terms of
categories employed by the subject but those may be changed (in accommodation)
in the process of absorbing perceptions into mental categories (in assimilation).
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